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This article provides a standard "Fort and Quirk"-style model of a professional team sports
league and analyzes the combined effect of salary restrictions (caps and floors) and revenue-sharing
arrangements. It shows that the invariance proposition does not hold even under Walrasian conjectures if
revenue sharing is combined with either a salary cap or a salary floor. In leagues with a binding salary
cap for large clubs but no binding salary floor for small clubs, revenue sharing will decrease the
competitive balance and increase club profits. Moreover, a salary cap produces a more balanced league
and decreases the cost per unit of talent. The effect of a more restrictive salary cap on the profits of the
small clubs is positive, whereas the effects on the profits of the large clubs as well as on aggregate profits
are ambiguous. In leagues with a binding salary floor for the small clubs but no binding salary cap for the
large clubs, revenue sharing will increase the competitive balance. Moreover, revenue sharing will
decrease (increase) the profits of large (small) clubs. Implementing a more restrictive salary floor
produces a less balanced league and increases the cost per unit of talent. Furthermore, a salary floor will
result in lower profits for all clubs.
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Invariance principles are the golden eggs of economics. Franco Modigliani, Merton Miller,
and Ronald Coase were awarded Nobel prizes for their formulations of important invariance
principles. A predecessor of the famous Coase theorem is Rottenberg's invariance proposition.
According to Rottenberg (1956), the distribution of playing talent between clubs in professional
sports leagues does not depend on the allocation of property rights to players' services.El-
Hodiri and Quirk (1971), Fort and Quirk (1995), and Vrooman (1995) extend this invariance
proposition to gate revenue sharing. Based on their models, they claim that revenue sharing
does not change the level of competitive balance within a league. This form of invariance
proposition has become one of the most heavily disputed issues in sports economics because its
centerpieces, revenue sharing and the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, represent two of the
most important idiosyncrasies in the professional team sports industry.
According to the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, fans prefer to attend games with un-
certain outcomes and enjoy close championship races. Unlike Toyota, which benets from weak
competitors in the automobile industry, Real Madrid and the New York Yankees need strong
competitors to maximize their revenues. In sports, a weak team produces a negative externality
on its stronger competitors. Revenue-sharing arrangements have been introduced as a measure
to improve the competitive balance by (partially) internalizing this externality. If the invariance
proposition held, revenue sharing would be worthless.
Current revenue-sharing schemes vary widely among professional sports leagues all over the
world. The most prominent is possibly that operated by the National Football League (NFL),
where the visiting club secures 40% of the locally earned television and gate receipt revenue. In
1876, Major League Baseball (MLB) introduced a 50-50 split of gate receipts that was reduced
over time. Since 2003, all the clubs in the American League have put 34% of their locally
generated revenue (gate, concession, television, etc.) into a central pool, which is then divided
equally among all the clubs. In the Australian Football League (AFL), gate receipts were at one
time split evenly between the home and the visiting team. This 50-50 split was nally abolished
in 2000.
Other measures to increase competitive balance are salary caps and 
oors. A salary cap
(
oor) puts an upper (lower) bound on a club's payroll. Since most leagues compute their
salary caps and 
oors on the basis of the revenues of the preceding season, caps and 
oors can
be treated as xed limits.
The North-American National Basketball Association (NBA) was the rst league to intro-
duce a salary cap for the 1984-1985 season. For the 2008-2009 season the (soft) salary cap is
2xed at US$ 58.7 million. Today, salary caps are in eect in professional team sports leagues
all over the world. In the National Hockey League (NHL), for example, each team had to spend
between US$ 34.3 million and 50.3 million on player salaries in the 2007-08 season. In the
National Football League (NFL), the salary cap in 2008 was approximately US$116 million per
team, whereas the salary 
oor was 85.2% of the salary cap, which is equivalent to US$ 98.8
million. The Australian Football League (AFL) also operates with a combined salary cap and

oor: for 2009, the salary cap was xed at AU$ 8.81 million, the 
oor at 7.93 million. Another
Australian league, the National Rugby League, has implemented a salary cap and 
oor system
which forced each team to spend between AU$ 3.69 million and 4.1 million in 2008. In Europe,
salary caps are in eect in the Guiness Premiership in rugby union and the Super League in
rugby league.
In any industry other than the team sport industry, payroll caps would be regarded as an
exploitation of market power and would be prohibited by anti-trust authorities. In professional
team sports, however, salary cap (and 
oor) arrangements are usually granted anti-trust exemp-
tion whenever they are the result of collective bargaining agreements between representatives
of club owners and players.
In the sports economic literature, the invariance proposition with regard to revenue sharing
has been derived under two major assumptions: First, club owners are modeled as prot maxi-
mizers (rather than win maximizers). Second, talent supply is regarded as xed. There is wide
agreement that the invariance proposition does not hold in leagues with either win-maximizing
owners or 
exible talent supply (Atkinson et al. 1988; Szymanski, 2003 K esenne 2000, 2005,
2007). There is disagreement, however, over whether the invariance proposition holds in a
league with prot-maximizing owners and a xed talent supply. The models of El-Hodiri and
Quirk (1971), Fort and Quirk (1995), and Vrooman (1995) show that the invariance proposition
does hold with respect to revenue sharing, whereas the model of Szymanski and K esenne (2004)
concludes that gate revenue sharing results in a more uneven distribution of talent between
large- and small-market clubs and therefore contradicts the invariance proposition. Since all of
these models use the same assumptions, namely, a xed supply of talent and prot-maximizing
club owners, the contradiction results from methodological dierences. El-Hodiri and Quirk,
Fort and Quirk, and Vrooman use "Walrasian conjectures," whereas Szymanski and K esenne
employ "Nash conjectures."
Our contribution to the literature is to show that the invariance proposition does not hold
even in a standard "Fort and Quirk" style (FQ-style) model if one considers the combined eect
of salary restrictions (salary cap and 
oor) and revenue-sharing agreements. In particular, we
3analyze the joint eect of salary restrictions and revenue sharing on club prots, player salaries,
and competitive balance. We show that in leagues with a binding salary cap for large clubs but
no binding salary 
oor for small clubs, revenue sharing will decrease competitive balance and
increase the prots of the small clubs as well as aggregate prots. The eect on the prots of
the large clubs is ambiguous. In this case, a salary cap also results in a more balanced league.
The eect of a stricter salary cap on the prots of small clubs is positive, whereas the eects
on the prots of the large clubs and on aggregate prots are ambiguous.
Moreover, in leagues with a binding salary 
oor for the small clubs but no binding salary
cap for the large clubs, revenue sharing will increase competitive balance. Moreover, revenue
sharing will decrease (increase) the prots of large (small) clubs. Implementation of a more
restrictive salary 
oor will produce a less balanced league and will increase the cost per unit of
talent. Furthermore, a salary 
oor will result in lower prots for all clubs. Finally, our analysis
shows that revenue sharing decreases the cost per unit of talent in all regimes except when
either the salary cap or the salary 
oor is binding for all clubs.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In the next section we present our model
setup with the main assumptions. In Subsection 2.1, we consider Regime A which represents
the benchmark case without a (binding) salary cap/salary 
oor. In Subsection 2.2, we consider
Regime B where the salary cap is only binding for the large-market club and the salary 
oor
is not binding for the small-market club. In Subsection 2.3, we analyze Regime C where the
salary 
oor is only binding for the small-market club and the salary cap is not binding for the
large-market club. Subsection 2.4, represents Regime D where either the salary cap or the
salary 
oor is binding for both clubs. Finally, Section 3 concludes.
2 Model
We model the investment behavior of two prot-maximizing clubs in a standard FQ-style league.
Each club i = 1;2 invests independently in playing talent ti in order to maximize its own prots.
Our league features a pool revenue sharing arrangement, and salary payments (payroll) are
restricted by both a salary cap (upper limit) and a salary 
oor (lower limit).
The revenue of club i (Ri) depends on its market size (mi) as well as its own win percentage
(wi) and the win percentage (wj) of the other club. We assume that the revenue function has
the following properties: @Ri
@wi > 0 and @2Ri
@w2
i
< 0 for all wi 2 [0;1] or 9! (wi) 2 (0;1) such that
@Ri
@wi > 0 8wi 2 (0;(wi)) and @Ri
@wi < 0 8wi 2 ((wi);1]. The following specication of the revenue
4function for club i satises the required properties:1
Ri = mi(wi + wiwj) = mi(2wi   w2
i): (1)
We assume that club 1 is the large market club with a higher drawing potential than the small
market club 2 such that m1 > m2. For notational simplicity and without loss of generality, we
normalize m2 to unity and write m instead of m1 with m > 1.
The win percentage wi of club i is characterized by the contest-success function (CSF),
which maps the vector (t1;t2) of talent onto probabilities for each club. We apply the logit
approach, which is the most widely used functional form of a CSF in sporting contests.2 The














with i;j = 1;2; i 6= j. For the sake of tractability, we normalize the "power parameter" 
 in
the following to unity.3 Given that the win percentages must sum up to unity, we obtain the
adding-up constraint: wj = 1   wi. Since we consider a standard FQ-style model, we assume a
xed supply of talent given by s > 0 and adopt the so-called "Walrasian conjecture" dti
dtj =  1.




ti + tj   ti(1 +
@tj
@ti)




We measure the competitive balance in the league by the product of win percentages wiwj.5
Moreover, we introduce revenue sharing in our league and assume that club revenues are shared
according to a pool-sharing agreement. In a simplied pool-sharing agreement, each club con-
tributes a certain percentage (1   ) of their individual revenues in a pool that is managed by
the league and equally distributed among the clubs.6 In its simplest version, the after-sharing
1This specication of the revenue function is widely used in the sports economic literature: see, e.g., Hoehn
and Szymanski (1999), Szymanski (2003), Szymanski and K esenne (2004), K esenne (2006, 2007) and Vrooman
(2007, 2008).
2The logit CSF was generally introduced by Tullock (1980) and subsequently axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996)
and Clark and Riis (1998). An alternative functional form would be the probit CSF (e.g., Lazear and Rosen,
1981; Dixit, 1987) and the dierence-form CSF (e.g., Hirshleifer, 1989).
3See Dietl et al. (2008) and Fort and Winfree (2009) for a more detailed analysis of the role of the power
parameter.
4For a discussion of the "Walrasian conjecture" vs. the "Nash conjecture", see, e.g., Szymanski (2004) and
Fort and Quirk (2007).
5For an analysis of competitive balance in the North American Major Leagues, see, e.g., Fort and Lee (2007).
6Note that the results are robust also for a gate revenue-sharing agreement where club i obtains share  of its
own revenues Ri and from the away match share (1   ) of club j's revenues Rj. In this case, the after-sharing
revenues of club i are given by b Ri = Ri + (1   )Rj (for an analysis, see, e.g., Dietl and Lang, 2008).
5revenues of club i can be written as




with  2 (0;1] and i;j = 1;2; i 6= j. The limiting case of  = 1 describes a league without
revenue sharing, whereas  = 0 describes a league with full revenue sharing.
We derive the following lemma:7
Lemma 1 test









Proof. Straightforward and therefore omitted.
The win percentages that maximize aggregate after-sharing revenues are independent of
the revenue-sharing parameter . This is due to the fact that the after-sharing aggregate club
revenues are given by the sum of the individual revenues of club 1 and 2, i.e. b R1+ b R2 = R1+R2.
Moreover, as is standard in the literature, we assume constant marginal costs c of talent
such that the salary payments (payroll) of club i, denoted by xi, are given by xi = c  ti.8
The prot function of club i = 1;2 is then given by after-sharing revenues minus salary
payments
i(ti;tj) = b Ri(ti;tj)   c  ti;
with i;j = 1;2; i 6= j.
As mentioned above, we introduce both an upper limit (salary cap) and a lower limit (salary

oor) for each club's payroll. The sizes of the salary cap and salary 
oor, which are the same for
each club, are based on the total league revenue in the previous season, divided by the number
of clubs in the league. The salary cap and the salary 
oor are therefore exogenously given in
the current season.9
Each club invests independently in playing talent such that its own prots are maximized
subject to the salary cap and salary 
oor constraints. That is, salary payments xi = c  ti must
be at least as high as floor > 0, given by the salary 
oor, but must not exceed cap > 0, given
7For a comparison of the noncooperative outcome and the socially optimal outcome, see, e.g., Cyrenne (2001),
Whitney (2005) and Dietl, Lang and Werner (2009).
8For the sake of simplicity, we do not take into account non-labor costs and normalize the xed capital cost to
zero. See Vrooman (1995) for a more general cost function where clubs have dierent marginal costs or K esenne
(2007) for a cost function with a xed capital cost. Idson and Kahane (2000) analyze the eect of team attributes
on player salaries.
9See, e.g., K esenne (2000a) and Dietl, Lang and Rathke (2009).







(Ri(ti;tj) + Rj(ti;tj))   c  ti

subject to floor  c  ti  cap:
The corresponding rst-order conditions are derived as10
@ b Ri
@ti





  c   i1c + i2c
!
= 0; i1(cap   cti) = 0; i2(cti   floor) = 0;
(3)
where ij  0 are Lagrange multipliers. The equilibrium in talent (t
1;t
2) is characterized by
(3) and the market-clearing condition t
1 + t
2 = s due to the xed supply of talent.
We must distinguish dierent regimes depending on whether the salary cap and/or salary

oor is binding or not.
2.1 Regime A: neither salary cap nor salary 
oor is binding
In this section, we assume that the salary cap and salary 
oor are ineective for both clubs;
i.e., we consider the benchmark case that no (binding) salary cap/
oor exists. In Regime A,



























We derive that the large club demands more talent in equilibrium than does the small club,
because the marginal revenue of talent is higher for the large club. Furthermore, note that the








, coincide with the
revenue-maximizing win percentages (w
1;w
2) from Lemma 1.12 It follows that aggregate club
revenues are maximized in Regime A.
10It can easily be veried that the second-order conditions for a maximum are satised.





















independent of the revenue-sharing parameter .




















Thus, we are in Regime A if floor < xA
2 and cap > xA
1 .
In the following proposition, we summarize the eect of changing the revenue-sharing pa-
rameter  in Regime A:
Proposition 1 test
(i) The invariance proposition holds in Regime A: revenue sharing has no eect on the dis-
tribution of talent.
(ii) Revenue sharing decreases the cost per unit of talent in Regime A.
(iii) Revenue sharing increases the prots of the small club and aggregate club prots. The
prots of the large club only increase if the dierence between both clubs in terms of market size
is not too big, i.e., if m < m0  2:83.
Proof. See Appendix.
In accordance with the literature, we derive that the well-known "invariance proposition"
with respect to revenue sharing holds in our FQ-style model when neither the salary cap nor
the salary 
oor is binding.13 That is, revenue sharing has no eect on the win percentages and
thus does not change the league's competitive balance in Regime A.
To illustrate this result, Figure 1 depicts the downward-sloping marginal after-sharing rev-
enue curves as functions of the win percentages for the two clubs. The two topmost lines indicate
the case of no revenue sharing, i.e.,  = 1. When revenue starts to be shared, the marginal
revenue curves shift down for both clubs. Instead of receiving all the additional revenue from
an extra unit of talent, the clubs receive only (1 + )=2 of the additional revenue. This results
in a downward shift of both marginal revenue curves, where the shift is more pronounced for
the large club.
Moreover, increasing the win percentage of club i is tantamount to reducing the win percent-
age of club j. As a result, club j's contribution to the shared pool is shrinking. It follows that
club i loses (1 )=2 of club j's reduced revenue when increasing its win percentage. Note that
the contribution to the pool increases with the degree of revenue sharing. Since the large club's
contribution to the pool is always greater than the small club's contribution, it follows that the
small club loses more through a higher degree of revenue sharing. As a consequence, more rev-
enue sharing implies that marginal revenue is decreasing faster for the small club, whereas the















Figure 1: Eect of revenue sharing on marginal revenues
marginal revenue curve of the big club is getting 
atter. Overall, even though the intercept of
the big club shifts down more than the intercept of the small club, the two curves still intersect
at the same pair of win percentages (wA
1 ;wA
2 ) for all values of  because the changing slopes
oset the change of the intercepts.
Moreover, the proposition shows that a higher degree of revenue sharing, i.e., a lower value
of , lowers the equilibrium cost per unit of talent. As argued above, marginal revenue decreases
for both clubs and with it talent demand tA
i (c) (depending on c). Hence, the market-clearing
cost per unit of talent cA set by the "Walrasian auctioneer" also has to be lower.
Even though revenue sharing leaves the distribution of talent unchanged and therefore also
the revenues of both clubs, it has implications for club prots. A higher degree of revenue
sharing will increase the prot of the small club in Regime A, because revenue sharing lowers
the cost per unit of talent and redistributes some of the money to the small club. As a result,
the small club's after-sharing revenues b R2 and prots increase through revenue sharing.
Despite the fact that salary payments xA
i will decrease for both clubs, revenue sharing
decreases the prot of the large club if the dierence between both clubs in terms of market size
is too big, i.e.,
@A
1
@ > 0 , m > m0  2:83. Note that the large club's after-sharing revenues b R1
decline as a result of the redistribution to the small club. If the market size is greater than m0,
the lower costs cannot compensate for the lower revenues.14
On aggregate, however, club prots increase because aggregate revenues RA
1 + RA
2 are in-
dependent of  and thus remain constant but costs decline through revenue sharing. Due to
the contest structure, the maximum level of aggregate club prot would be attained in a league
14Note that the large club's salary payments x
A
1 are an increasing function in the market size m.
9with full revenue sharing, i.e., for  = 0, because in this case both clubs would fully internalize
the externality they impose on the other club when hiring an additional unit of talent.15
2.2 Regime B: salary cap is binding for large club, but salary 
oor is not
binding for small club
In this section, we assume that the salary cap is only binding for the large-market club and that
the salary 
oor is not binding for the small-market club. In Regime B, the equilibrium demand































(   1)2m2 + 4cap(1 +  + m(1   )).17 The equilibrium salary payments in











((   1)m + B   2cap)

:










with a suciently low
salary 
oor.18 The condition for cap guarantees that the salary payments of the small club are
lower than cap. Otherwise the salary cap would be binding for both clubs and we would be in




implicitly denes the interval of feasible








2.2.1 The eect of a salary cap in Regime B
In this subsection, we analyze the eect of changing the salary cap parameter given that the
league has set a certain degree 0 of revenue sharing. We derive the following results:
15However, we assume that players have a certain reservation wage c
w > 0 such that  = 0 is not a feasible
solution.























18Note that cap is less than zero if the dierence between both clubs is too big, i.e. cap < 0 , m >
1+
1 .













we are in Regime A.





. Decreasing (increasing) the revenue-sharing
parameter  induces both cap and cap to decrease (increase). If  decreases below , then cap
0 > cap = x
A
1 ,
and we would be in Regime A because the cap would not be binding anymore. If  increases above 
B, then
cap
0 < cap and we would be in Regime D.
10Proposition 2 test
The introduction of a binding salary cap increases competitive balance and decreases the cost
per unit of talent in Regime B.
Proof. See Appendix.
The salary cap forces the large club to cut back on expenses, lowering the overall demand for
talent, and thus the market-clearing cost per unit of talent cB set by the Walrasian auctioneer
is lower. As a consequence, the small club will hire a greater amount of talent.
Hence, a more restrictive salary cap (i.e., a lower value of cap) induces a reallocation of talent
from the large to the small club. That is, the large club decreases its talent demand by the







As a consequence, a more restrictive salary cap increases the win percentage wB
2 of the small
club and decreases the win percentage wB
1 of the large club in Regime B. Since the large club
is the dominant team, competitive balance increases and thus a salary cap produces a more
balanced league. It follows that the individual revenues RB
1 of the large club decrease and that
the individual revenues RB
2 of the small club increase through a more restrictive salary cap.
Aggregate club revenues RB
1 + RB
2 , however, will decline because the league departs from the
revenue-maximizing win percentages (w
1;w
2). Thus, the after-sharing revenues b R1 of the large
club decline, and the after-sharing revenues b R2 of the small club increase (see also Figure 1).
The second part of the proposition states that the cost per unit of talent will be lower in
equilibrium through the introduction of a salary cap, i.e., @cB
@cap > 0. It is therefore clear that a
more restrictive salary cap helps the large club to control costs, because the large club decreases
its salary payments, i.e.,
@xB
1
@cap > 0. But will a salary cap also help the small club to lower costs?













> > > <
> > > :
> 0 if cap 2 (cap;g cap);
= 0 if cap = g cap;
< 0 if cap 2 (g cap;cap);
with g cap =
1+2m+a(2+a(1 2m))
4(1+a+m(1 a)) .21 That is, if the salary cap is not too restrictive, i.e., cap 2
(g cap;cap), the increase in talent demand osets for the decrease in the cost per unit of talent
such that salary payments xB
2 of the small club increase. However, if the salary cap is relatively
restrictive, i.e., cap 2 (cap;g cap), the decrease in the cost per unit of talent outweighs the
21Note that depending on the parameters (;m), the threshold g cap can be bigger than cap. In this case, the
salary payments of the small club always decrease through a tighter salary cap.
11increase in talent demand, and salary payments xB
2 decrease. Moreover, we derive that a salary




@cap > 0.22 That is, the increase in
the small club's salary payments never osets the decrease in the large club's salary payments.
In the next proposition, we analyze how changes in the salary cap aect club prots:
Proposition 3 test
A more restrictive salary cap increases the prots of the large club and aggregate club prof-
its until the maximum is reached for cap = cap and cap = cap, respectively, whereas the
prots of the small club will always increase through a more restrictive salary cap.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 2 illustrates the proposition's results. A more restrictive salary cap increases aggre-
gate club prots B until the maximum is reached for cap = cap. Intuitively, a salary cap
has two eects on club prots. On the one hand, a more restrictive salary cap lowers aggregate
club revenues because the league departs from the revenue-maximizing win percentages from
Regime A. On the other hand, it lowers the cost per unit of talent. Suppose that the league has
set a relatively loose salary cap. By implementing a more restrictive salary cap, the marginal
(positive) eect of lower aggregate club costs xB
1 +xB
2 outweighs the marginal (negative) eect
of lower aggregate club revenues RB
1 + RB
2 such that aggregate club prots increase. Both ef-
fects balance each other out for cap = cap. By implementing a more restrictive salary cap
than cap, the lower club costs cannot compensate for the lower aggregate club revenues, and
therefore aggregate club prots will decrease.23
For a relatively loose salary cap, the prots of both clubs will increase through the intro-
duction of a salary cap. The small club, however, will always benet, independent of the size
of the salary cap, whereas the large club has an interest in the salary cap not being too re-
strictive. Formally, a more restrictive salary cap increases the prot of the large club B
1 until
the maximum is reached for cap = cap. The intuition is as follows. Remember that a more
restrictive salary cap will increase (decrease) the small (large) club's after-sharing revenues. For
the small club, even in the case that a more restrictive salary cap increases the club's costs (i.e.,
for cap 2 (g cap;cap)), the higher revenues oset for the higher costs and the prots of the small
club will increase. For the large club the reasoning is similar that for aggregate prots above.
The lower costs can only outweigh the lower club revenues if the salary cap is not set to be too
restrictive, i.e., if cap > cap. Otherwise, the prots of the large club will decrease through a













23Note the equilibrium cost per talent c
B(cap) is a convex function in cap, i.e.,
@2cB(cap)
@cap2 > 0. Thus, tightening






Regime B Regime A
cap**
ð2
Figure 2: Eect of a salary cap on club prots
more restrictive salary cap and can even be lower than in Regime A.
Moreover, note that the salary cap that maximizes the prots of the large club is less
restrictive than the salary cap that maximizes aggregate club prots, i.e., cap > cap. If
cap < cap, the prots of the large club already start to decrease, but the additional prots of
the small club exceed the losses of the large club, and aggregate prots thus still increase until
cap = cap.
2.2.2 The eect of revenue sharing in Regime B
In this subsection, we analyze the eect of changing the revenue-sharing parameter  in Regime





The eect of revenue sharing on talent demand and the cost per unit of talent is derived in
the following proposition:
Proposition 4 test
(i) The invariance proposition does not hold in Regime B: revenue sharing decreases com-
petitive balance.
(ii) Revenue sharing decreases the cost per unit of talent in Regime B.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proposition shows that the invariance proposition with respect to revenue sharing does
not hold when a revenue-sharing arrangement is combined with a (binding) salary cap. A higher
degree of revenue sharing (i.e., a lower value of ) induces a reallocation of talent from the small
to the large club. That is, the large club increases its talent demand by the same amount by







13As a consequence, revenue sharing increases the win percentage wB
1 of the large club and
decreases the win percentage wB
2 of the small club, producing a more unbalanced league. It fol-
lows that the individual revenues RB
1 (RB
2 ) of the large (small) club increase (decrease) through
a higher degree of revenue sharing. In the aggregate, club revenues RB
1 + RB
2 in Regime B will
increase through more revenue sharing because the league approaches the revenue-maximizing
win percentages (w
1;w
2). Thus, revenue sharing counteracts the salary cap's positive eect on
competitive balance in the league.24
As discussed in Section 2.1, more revenue sharing inevitably decreases marginal revenue
and thus the talent demand for both clubs. As the talent demand of the small club decreases,
the cost per unit of talent also has to decrease in order to clear the labor market. This in




@ > 0, whereas the salary payments of the large club are xed to the salary
cap.
The eect of revenue sharing on club prots is analyzed in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 test
Revenue sharing increases the prots of both clubs and thus also aggregate club prots.
Proof. Straightforward and therefore omitted.
The proposition shows that both the small and the large club benet from revenue sharing.
On the one hand, the introduction of a revenue-sharing arrangement increases aggregate club
revenues RB
1 + RB
2 in the league. Note that the large club's individual revenues RB
1 and thus
its after-sharing revenues b RB
1 also increase. Even though the individual revenues of the small
club decrease RB
2 through revenue sharing, this club's after-sharing revenues b RB
2 increase due
to the higher aggregate club revenues. On the other hand, revenue sharing decreases the costs
of the small club due its lower salary payments and does not change the cost side of the large
club. As a consequence, revenue sharing increases the prots of both clubs.
What would happen if in addition to a binding salary cap (for the large club), a binding
salary 
oor (for the small club) was also introduced? The salary 
oor would have an eect
opposite to that of the salary cap. The salary 
oor would articially boost the demand of the
small club. This would increase the cost per unit of talent and reallocate talent from the large
to the small club. Aggregate revenues would deteriorate as the distribution of win percentages
would move further away from the optimal allocation. As a consequence, prots of the large
24See also Vrooman (2007, 2008).
14club would shrink as revenue decreases and costs rise. For the small club, the eect is ambigu
ous and would depend on whether the additional revenue exceeds the increased costs.
2.3 Regime C: salary cap is not binding for large club, but salary 
oor is
binding for small club
In this section, we assume that the salary 
oor is only binding for the small-market club and
the salary cap is not binding for the large-market club. In Regime C, the equilibrium demand
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   1) + C   2floor);floor
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loose salary cap. The condition for floor guarantees that the salary payments of the large club
are higher than floor. Otherwise, the salary 
oor would be binding for both clubs and we













2.3.1 The eect of a salary 
oor in Regime C
In this subsection, we analyze the eect of changing the salary 
oor parameter given that the
league has set a certain degree 00 of revenue sharing. We derive the following results:
Proposition 6 test
The introduction of a binding salary 
oor increases both competitive balance and the cost per
unit of talent in Regime C.
Proof. See Appendix.
















26Note that (   1)


















2 and we are in Regime E.
15The reasoning for this result is similar to that for Regime B. The salary 
oor forces the small
club to enhance expenses thereby raising the overall demand for talent and thus the market
clearing cost per unit of talent. Despite this, the small club hires a larger amount of talent.
Hence, implementing a more restrictive salary 
oor induces a reallocation of talent from






@floor > 0.28 A higher value of floor
decreases the win percentage wC
1 of the large club and increases the win percentage wC
2 of the
small club. As a result, competitive balance increases in Regime C. Moreover, the large club's
individual revenue RC
1 will decrease, and the small club's individual revenue RC
2 will increase.
Aggregate club revenues RC
1 + RC
2 , however, will decrease because the league departs from the
revenue-maximizing win percentages from Regime A.
Moreover, a more restrictive salary 




@floor > 0, i = 1;2. This is obvious for the small club, as price and quantity
of talent increase. For the large club, the decrease in talent demand cannot compensate for the
increase in cost per unit of talent. As a result, salary payments will also increase for the large
club.
The eect of a salary 
oor on club prots is stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 7 test
A more restrictive salary 
oor decreases the prots of both clubs and thus also aggregate club
prots.
Proof. See Appendix.
It is clear that the prots of the large club will decrease because this club's revenues decrease
and its costs increase. However, the eect of a more restrictive salary 
oor on the prots of
the small club is also negative. Note that in Regime A, the condition that marginal revenue
equals marginal cost holds for the small club. Moreover, a more restrictive salary 
oor yields a
higher win percentage for the small club and thus induces a decrease in the marginal revenue
of the small club. Additionally, cost per unit of talent increases. All together this implies that
additional revenues cannot compensate for the higher costs.
2.3.2 The eect of revenue sharing in Regime C
In this subsection, we analyze the eect of changing the revenue-sharing parameter  in Regime





We analyze the eect of revenue sharing on talent demand and the cost per unit of talent
in the following proposition:
28Note that a more restrictive salary 
oor is characterized by a higher level of floor.
16Proposition 8 test
(i) The invariance proposition does not hold in Regime C: revenue sharing increases com-
petitive balance.
(ii) Revenue sharing decreases the cost per unit of talent in Regime C.
Proof. See Appendix.
As noted above, revenue sharing always decreases marginal revenue and thus the talent
demand of the large club. This implies that the market-clearing cost per unit of talent decreases
and that the large club hires less talent. The lower cost per unit of talent reduces aggregate
salary payments.29
As in Regime B, the invariance proposition does not hold when revenue sharing is combined
with a (binding) salary 
oor. In contrast to Regime B, a higher degree of revenue sharing
produces a more balanced league in Regime C because the large club decreases its talent demand







0. As a result, more revenue sharing increases (decreases) the win percentage wC
2 (wC
1 ) of the
small (large) club and therefore increases (decreases) the individual revenues RC
2 (RC
1 ) of the
small (large) club. Moreover, we depart from the revenue-maximizing win percentages from
Regime A, and aggregate club revenues RC
1 + RC
2 will thus decrease through revenue sharing.
Both mechanisms - a salary 
oor and a revenue-sharing arrangement - contribute to pro-
ducing more balanced competition. However, the revenue-sharing arrangement achieves this
goal with lower costs (salary payments), because it lowers the costs of the large club, whereas
a salary 
oor increases the costs of both clubs.
The eect of revenue sharing on clubs' prot is analyzed in the following proposition:
Proposition 9 test
Revenue sharing increases the prots of the small club and decreases the prots of the large
club.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proposition shows that only the small club benets from a revenue-sharing arrangement
in Regime C. The positive eect of revenue sharing through lower costs and higher individual
revenue RC
2 for the small club compensates for the lower aggregate revenues RC
1 +RC
2 . For the
large club, the eect is dierent, because the lower costs cannot compensate for lower (individual
and aggregate) revenues, and thus prots decrease.
29Note that the salary payments of the small club are unaected by revenue sharing.
172.4 Regime D: either salary cap or salary 
oor is binding for both clubs
In this section, we assume that either the salary cap or the salary 
oor is binding for both clubs.
For notation's sake, we write  2 ffloor;capg.30 In Regime D, the equilibrium demand for



























= (;) with  2 ffloor;capg,
depending on whether we consider a binding salary 
oor or salary cap for both clubs. Thus,
we are in Regime D if either floor > floor or cap < cap. In the rst case, the salary 
oor is
binding for both clubs, and in the second case, the salary cap is binding for both clubs.31
From (7), we derive that a change in the salary cap (salary 
oor) does not change the
distribution of talent in Regime D. However, by implementing a more restrictive salary cap,
the cost per unit of talent cD decreases, whereas cD increases through a more restrictive salary

oor.
A salary cap is therefore benecial for club prots because it lowers the costs of both clubs
and club revenues remain unchanged. The opposite is true for a more restrictive salary 
oor,
because it raises clubs' costs and leaves clubs' revenues unchanged.
Moreover, we see that talent demand and the cost per unit of talent are independent of
the revenue-sharing parameter  if the salary 
oor (cap) is binding for both clubs, i.e., for
 2 ffloor;capg. Thus, the invariance principle holds in Regime D because revenue sharing
has no eect on the distribution of talent and thus does not aect individual club revenues.
Moreover, the cost per unit of talent cD is alsoare unaected by revenue sharing.
As in Regime A, revenue sharing redistributes revenues from the large to the small club. As
a consequence, the prots of the large club decrease and the prots of the small club increase
through a higher degree of revenue sharing. Aggregate club prots, however, are not aected
by revenue sharing in Regime D.
3 Conclusion
In this article, we have analyzed the combined eect of salary restrictions (salary cap and 
oor)
and revenue-sharing agreements on club prots, player salaries, and competitive balance. For
30Note that we consider both cases at the same time because the analyses are very similar.
31Note that the salary cap has to be suciently large (rst case) and the salary 
oor has to be suciently
small (second case).
18our analysis, we used a standard FQ-style model with Walrasian conjectures.
We show that in the well-known case of a league without a binding salary cap or 
oor, the
famous invariance proposition holds. Although revenue sharing has no eect on the distribution
of talent it does have implications for the distribution of benets between clubs and players.
Revenue sharing inevitably lowers the market-clearing cost per unit of talent and increases the
prots of the small clubs and aggregate club prots. The eect on the prots of the large club
is ambiguous and depends on the dierence between the clubs in terms of market size. This
means that revenue sharing can be used to redistribute rents from clubs to players and vice
versa.
However, the invariance proposition does not hold even under Walrasian conjectures if rev-
enue sharing is combined with either a salary cap or a salary 
oor. Introducing a salary cap has
the intended eect of increasing competitive balance and increasing the prots of the small club.
A salary cap therefore eectively supports the small clubs. However, the increased competitive
balance is detrimental to aggregate league revenues, because talent is removed from its most
productive use. In this situation, adding a revenue-sharing arrangement helps to reallocate
talent back to its most productive use. Additionally, increased revenue sharing lowers costs and
increases prots. Therefore, far from being invariant, revenue sharing is a very eective tool for
cross-subsidization.
Introducing a salary 
oor is benecial to players but achieves this by departing from the
productive allocation of talent and lowering the prots of the clubs. In this case, revenue sharing
will worsen the misallocation. We conclude that the mixture of revenue sharing and salary caps
is preferable.
The analysis has shown that both a salary cap and a salary 
oor contribute to improving
competitive balance in the league. From the perspective of a league planner, however, a fully
balanced league is not desired, i.e., a certain degree of imbalance is favorable. In our model,
the league optimum (w
1;w
2), dened as the allocation of talent that maximizes aggregate
league revenues, is characterized by an allocation of talent where the large club is the dominant
team that has a higher win percentage than the small club. According to our analysis, this
league optimal degree of imbalance, which increases in the dierence between clubs, is already
achieved in a league with revenue sharing that has implemented neither a salary cap nor a salary

oor.32 Every intervention to improve competitive balance like salary caps and salary 
oors
combined with revenue sharing arrangements, is counter-productive, because it will result in an
unproductive allocation of talent.
32Remember that due to the invariance principle, revenue sharing has no eect on the league optimal allocation.
19Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of Part (i) and (ii) is straightforward by inspection of(4) which represents the demand
for talent and the cost per unit of talent in equilibrium.
In order to prove Part (iii), we compute the equilibrium after-sharing revenues of club i = 1;2
in Regime A as follows:
b RA
1 =




(1 + m)(1 + m + m2)   (m   1)(1 + m(3 + m))
2(1 + m)2











2(1+m)2 < 0 8 2 (1;0): Thus after-sharing revenues of the large (small) club de-
crease (increase) through a higher degree of revenue sharing, i.e. a lower value of the parameter
.
The equilibrium prots of club i = 1;2 in Regime A are then given by A




2 = b RA
2   xA





m( 2 + m(m   2))   1





 m(1 + m)2 + (1   m)




@ > 0 , m3   2m(1 + m)   1 > 0. Thus,
@A
1




@ < 0 8 2 (1;0) and m > 1. Thus revenue sharing always increases the prots of
the small club A
2 whereas the prots of the large club A
1 only increase if the dierence between
both clubs in terms of market size is not too big, i.e. if m < m0. It is obvious that aggregate
club prots increase through revenue sharing because aggregate revenues are independent of 
whereas the clubs' costs (aggregate salary payments) decrease. This proves the proposition.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2











order to prove that a more restrictive salary cap produces a more balanced league by increasing
the win percentages of the small club and decreasing the win percentage of the large club, we










m(   1) + B and wB









B > 0 and
@wB
2
@cap =   1
B < 0. It follows that a more restrictive salary cap, i.e. a
lower value of cap, produces a more balanced league by increasing competitive balance.33 This
proves the rst part of the proposition.
The derivative of the equilibrium cost per unit of talent cB =
( 1)m+B
2s in Regime B
with respect to cap is given by @cB
@cap =
1++m(1 )
Bs > 0. This proves the second part of the
proposition.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
In order to prove the claim, without loss of generality, we normalize the supply of talent to
unity, i.e. s = 1. Moreover, we consider a league without revenue sharing, i.e.  = 1.34 In this



































= 0 , cap =
2m2
(2 + m)2
We derive cap > cap. The derivative of the small club's prots B























This proves the claim.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Ad (i) In order to prove that the invariance proposition does not hold in Regime B, we compute
the derivative of the clubs' talent demand (tB
1 ;tB

















33Remember that club 1 is the dominant team which has a higher win percentage than club 2.
34It can be shown that the result holds true for all  2 [0;1].
21with B =
p
(   1)2m2 + 4cap(1 +  + m(1   )). We deduce that
@tB
1











.35 Thus, revenue sharing changes the allocation
of talent in Regime B because it induces the large club to increase its demand for talent and
the small club to decrease its demand for talent. As a consequence the large (small) club's
win percentage wB
1 (wB
2 ) increases (decreases). Since the large club is the dominant team,
competitive balance decreases as a result of revenue sharing.
Ad (ii) In order to prove that revenue sharing decreases the cost per unit of talent cB in












We deduce that @cB
@ > 0, because  2 (B;B). Thus, more revenue sharing (i.e. a lower value
of ) decreases cB which proves the claim.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 6












In order to prove that a more restrictive salary 
oor produces a more balanced league by
increasing the win percentages of the small club and decreasing the win percentage of the large









(   1)   2floor + C
(   1) + C and wC




(   1)2 + 4floor(1    + m(1 + )). The corresponding derivatives are given by
@wC
1
@floor =   1




C > 0. It follows that a more restrictive salary 
oor produces
a more balanced league by increasing competitive balance.36 This proves the rst part of the
proposition.
The derivative of the equilibrium cost per unit of talent cC =
( 1)m+B
2s in Regime C with
respect to floor is given by @cC
@floor =
1+(m 1)+m
Cs > 0. This proves the second part of the
proposition.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 7
It is straightforward to prove that the prots of the large club B
1 decrease through a more
restrictive salary 
oor: On the one hand, revenues (individual and aggregate revenues) decrease




which determines implicitely the corresponding
interval of feasible .
36Remember that club 1 is the dominant team which has a higher win percentage than club 2.
22and on the other hand costs (salary payments) increase for the large club. As a consequence,
prots decrease. A similar argument holds true to show that aggregate club prots B decrease.
In order to prove that also prots of the small club decrease we derive the derivative of B
2





a2(m   1)   (1 + m)(3C   1) + a(C   m(C   6))
2C(1 + (m   1) + m)
with C :=
p
(   1)2 + 4floor(1    + m(1 + )). We derive that
@B
2




. This proves the claim.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 8
Ad (i) In order to prove that the invariance proposition does not hold in Regime C, we compute
the derivative of the clubs' talent demand (tC
1 ;tC








   1 + 2floor(m   1) + C







(   1)2 + 4floor(1    + m(1 + )). We deduce that
@tC
1











. Thus, revenue sharing changes the alloca-
tion of talent in Regime C, because it induces the large (small) club to decrease (increase) its
demand for talent. As a consequence the large (small) club's win percentage wC
1 (wC
2 ) decreases
(increases). Since the large club is the dominant team, competitive balance increases as a result
of revenue sharing.
Ad (ii) In order to prove that revenue sharing decreases the cost per unit of talent cC in








   1 + 2floor(m   1)
C

We deduce that @cC
@ > 0, because  2 (C;C). Thus, more revenue sharing (lower value of )
decreases cC which proves the claim.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 9
First, we claim that the after-sharing revenues b RC
2 of the small club increase through a higher
degree of revenue sharing. To prove this claim, we derive that b RC
2 is maximized for b w2 =
1+






in Regime C are given by (6). We
deduce that b w2 > wC
2 , floor < floor0 :=
4(1+)m




@ < 0, it follows that after-sharing revenues b RC
2 increase through a higher degree of revenue
sharing (lower ). Remember that the small clubs' salary payments in Regime C are given by
xC
2 = floor and are unaected by revenue sharing. As a consequence, revenue sharing increases
the prots of the small club.
Second, we prove the claim for the large club: On the one hand, more revenue sharing induces
the after-sharing revenues b RC
1 of the large club to decrease because both individual revenues
RC
1 and aggregate revenues RC
1 + RC
2 decrease. On the other hand, the large club's costs also
decrease due to lower salary payments. However, the decrease in costs cannot compensate for
the decrease in after-sharing revenues and it follows that prots of the large club decrease.
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